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ABSTRACT
We use exogenous variation in the degree of restrictions to bank competition across Italian provinces
to study both the effects of bank regulation and the impact of deregulation. We find that where entry
was more restricted the cost of credit was higher and - contrary to expectations- access to credit
lower. The only benefit of these restrictions was a lower proportion of bad loans. Liberalization
brings a reduction in rates spreads and an increased access to credit at a cost of an increase in bad
loans. In provinces where restrictions to bank competition were most severe, the proportion of bad
loans after deregulation raises above the level present in more competitive markets, suggesting that
the pre-existing conditions severely impact the effect of liberalizations.
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luigi.zingales@gsb.uchicago.eduAs Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) exhaustively document, the banking sector is probably the most
intensely regulated sector throughout the world This is hardly surprising. If we espouse a benign view of
government regulation, there are several rationales that justify a government intervention. But the same is
true if we think government intervention is driven by political and electoral interests, rather than by the
desire to address market ineﬃciencies. The two views of government interventions obviously diﬀer in their
implications: one predicts a positive eﬀect of government regulation, the second a negative one.
In spite of the opposite predictions, these two views of regulation are hard to disentangle empirically.
According to the benign view of regulation, governments intervene more where markets fail more. Hence,
any attempt to estimate the eﬀects of bank regulation would spuriously attribute a negative eﬀect to bank
regulation unless the pre-existing degree of market failure is controlled for (an almost impossible task). Only
if the extent of regulation was exogenously imposed, we could hope to identify the true eﬀect of regulation.
In this paper we claim that the Italian banking law of 1936 represents such a natural experiment. Introduced
after major bank failures, the 1936 law had the objective of enhancing bank stability through severe restrictions
on competition. While homogeneously imposed throughout the country, these restrictions had diﬀerent impact
in diﬀerent areas, because they granted a diﬀerent ﬂexibility to expand to diﬀerent types of banks. Thus, an
unintended consequence of the law was a diﬀerent degree of competition across Italian provinces, determined on
the basis of the conditions pre-existing the 1936 law. We exploit this exogenous variation to assess the impact
that restrictions on competition have on the structure of the banking industry. Since all these regulations
were removed during the 1980s, we also exploit this diﬀerence in the starting points to assess how diﬀerentially
repressed ﬁnancial systems respond to liberalization.
We ﬁrst establish that the 1936 banking law curtailed competition in Italian banking industry pre deregu-
lation (i.e., pre 1990s) and diﬀerentially so depending on the type of banking institutions present in 1936. In
particular, the interest rate spread (lending minus deposit rate) charged to customers in diﬀerent provinces (a
measure of monopoly power) is directly related to measures of banking structure in 1936.
Then, we use a local indicator of the interest rate spread pre-deregulation as a measure of lack of competition
and we study the eﬀect of this lack of competition on the functioning of the banking industry and the real
economy. We ﬁnd that in provinces where there was more competition there was more access to credit (contrary
to what predicted by Petersen and Rajan, 1995) for both households and ﬁrms, more ﬁrms, and higher growth.
Consistent with the goals of the 1936 Banking Law we ﬁnd that provinces where there was less competition
1experience a lower percentage of bad loans. Finally, consistent with Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), we ﬁnd
that competition does not impact the quantity of loans.
Between the late 1980s and early 1990s Italy experienced several banking reforms. Entry was liberalized
(1990), the separation between short and long-term lending was removed (1993), the Savings and Loans legal
structure was transformed into a normal corporation, facilitating acquisition and mergers (1993), and starting
in 1994 all the major State-owned banks were privatized. Hence, we study the eﬀect of deregulation as a
function of the level of competition in the banking sector before deregulation. We ﬁnd that provinces that had
a less competitive banking sector during the regulation period experience a signiﬁcant increase in the number
of households who have access to credit. They also experience a reduction in the cost of borrowing, but also
an increase in the percentage of bad loans. The overall eﬀect is that after deregulation the provinces that were
more penalized by the restrictions in competition experience a higher-than-normal aggregate growth rate.
We are not the ﬁrst to identify the costs of bank regulation. The closest papers to ours are Jayaratne and
Strahan (1996), Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2003), and Guiso et al. (2004). The ﬁrst two papers use the cross
sectional variation in banking regulation across U.S. states to assess the impact of ﬁnancial development on
growth. The major diﬀerence is that U.S. states are free to choose their own regulation. Hence, it is diﬃcult to
disentangle the eﬀect of regulation from the eﬀects of the political and economic conditions that lead regulation
to be enacted or lifted. Such problem does not exist in our sample, since the legislation is homogenous and
we use the cross sectional diﬀerence in the tightness of this regulation. As we discuss in the text, this cross
sectional diﬀerence in tightness is determined by historical accidents and is unlikely to be correlated with the
phenomena we study. As Guiso et al. (2004), we use the cross sectional variation in regulation across Italian
provinces as an instrument. That paper, however, only focuses on the eﬀect of access to credit on aggregate
growth during the regulation period. By contrast, in this paper we measure the degree of competition across
diﬀerent local markets and relate it to several characteristics of the banking industry, as well as aggregate
growth, both before and after deregulation. In so doing we are better able to study the cost and beneﬁts of
banking regulation.
Our paper can also be seen as a within country analog of Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2003),
who study the eﬀect of banking regulation on the cost of credit across countries. They ﬁnd that regulation
increases the cost of credit but this eﬀect disappears once they control for property rights protection, leading
them to conjecture that banking regulation may reﬂect broader features of a country approach to competition.
2Our within country approach enable us to disentangle these two eﬀects and isolate the costs (as well as the
beneﬁts) of banking regulation.
Our paper is also related to Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2004) who analyze the eﬀects of banking
deregulation on the industrial structure in France in the 1980s. Their advantange is that they can rely on
ﬁrm-level data to trace the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on entry and exit. Our paper focuses instead on the
eﬀect of banking regulation and deregulation on the structure of the banking industry. The advantage of our
research design is the exogeneity of the tightness of regulation, which gives us an opportunity to shed some
empirical light on the trade oﬀ between banking competition and banking stability studied by Allen and Gale
(2004).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a brief history of Italian banking regulation.
Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 shows that the 1936 Banking Law had an enduring eﬀect on bank
competition, which translated into higher markups. Section 4 analyzes the impact that the diﬀerent levels of
competition had on access to credit, quantity of credit, percentage of bad loans, and aggregate growth. Section
5 repeats a similar analysis focusing on how the initial conditions aﬀected the impact of deregulation. Section
5 concludes.
I The History of Italian Banking Regulation
In response to the 1930-31 banking crisis, in 1936 Italy introduced a new banking law, which imposed rigid
limits on the ability of diﬀerent types of credit institutions to open new branches and extend credit. According
to the law, each credit institution was assigned a geographical area of competence based on its presence in
1936 and its ability to grow and lend was restricted to this area. A further directive, issued in 1938, regulated
diﬀerentially the ability of these institutions to grow. National banks could open branches only in the main
cities; cooperative and local commercial banks could only open branches within the boundaries of the province
they operated in 1936; while Savings banks could expand within the boundaries of the region - which comprises
several provinces - they operated in 1936. Furthermore, each of these banks was required to try and shut down
branches located outside of its geographical boundaries.
As Table 1 shows, this regulation deeply aﬀected banks’ ability to grow. Between 1936 and 1985 the
total number of bank oﬃces grew 87%. During the same period the number of bank oﬃces in the United
3States increased by 1228%.1 But Table 1 also shows that diﬀerent types of banks grew at a diﬀerent rate.
Savings banks and cooperatives’ (both local banks) oﬃces grew on average 138%, while big national banks
grew only 70%. Since these types of banks diﬀer only in their legal structure but not in their functions, it is
hard to explain these diﬀerential growth rates with diﬀerent growth in the demand for their service. A more
plausible explanation is that regulation allowed savings bank more latitude to grow. This regulation remained
substantially unchanged until the end of the 1980s.
We will exploit these diﬀerences in the tightness of ﬁnancial regulation across local credit markets to study
the eﬀects of restriction on competition. For this variation to be a good natural experiment, however, we
need to show that i) the number and composition of banks in 1936 is not linked to some characteristics of
the region that aﬀect the ability to do banking in that region and of ﬁrms to grow; ii) this regulation was not
designed with the needs of diﬀerent regions in mind, but it was “random”; iii) the reason why this regulation
was maintained until the end of the 1980s has nothing to do with the actual needs of diﬀerent regions.
A Why Regions Diﬀer in their Banking Structure in 1936
As discussed in Guiso et al. (2004), the number of bank branches in 1936 was not an equilibrium market
outcome, but the result of a Government-directed consolidation during the 1930-33 crisis. The Italian Govern-
ment bailed out the major national banks and the Savings Banks, but chose to let smaller commercial banks
and cooperative ones fail.
Furthermore, the regional diﬀusion of diﬀerent types of banks reﬂects the interaction between the subse-
quent waves of bank creation and the history of Italian uniﬁcation. The high concentration of savings banks
in the North East and the Center, for instance, reﬂects the fact that this institution originated in Austria and
expanded ﬁrst in the territory dominated by the Austrian Empire (Lombardia and the North East) and in the
nearby states, especially Tuscany and the Papal States. By contrast, two of the major national banks (Banca
Commerciale and Credito Italiano) were the result of direct German investments in the most economically
advanced regions at the time (Lombardia and Liguria).
As a result, as Guiso et al. (2004) show in Table 4, the four indicators of banking structure in 1936 - the
number of total branches (per million inhabitants) present in a region in 1936, the fraction of branches owned
by local versus national banks, the number of savings banks, and the number of cooperative banks per million
1See http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob
4inhabitants – are not correlated with economic development in 1936, once we control for the South dummy.
B Why Did the 1936 Law Favor Savings Banks?
There are two reasons why the Fascist regime favored Savings banks. First, Savings Banks were non-proﬁt
organizations, which had to distribute a substantial fraction of their net income to ”charitable activities”. Until
1931 these donations were spread among a large number of beneﬁciaries. Subsequently, however, the donations
became more concentrated toward political organizations created by the Fascists, such as the Youth Fascist
Organization (Opera Balilla) and the Women Fascist Organization (OMNI), (Polsi, 2003). Not surprisingly,
the Fascist regime found convenient to protect its ﬁnancial supporters!
The second reason is that the 1930-33 banking crisis was mainly due to the insolvency of major national
banks. This fear of the disastrous consequences of the failure of large banks created in the legislator a natural
bias against large banks.
C Why Was This Structure Maintained For So Long?
These diﬀerential restrictions, thus, have a clear rationale within the Fascist regime. But when in 1946 the
Bank of Italy restarted to authorize the creation of new branches, ”the new authorizations were mainly given
to Savings Banks and – to a smaller extent – to cooperative banks and local commercial banks” (Cotula and
Martinez Oliva, 2003). Hence, the two biases exhibited by the Central Bank during the Fascist period –hostility
toward national banks and favor towards Savings Banks – continued after the war. Why? All the historians
mention the quest for stability as an important factor. The memories of the 1930s crisis was still very vivid in
the Central Bank administration and continued to inform its action. This explanation could at best account
for the hostility towards large national banks, but what about Savings Banks? One opinion – prevalent among
historians inside the Central Bank – is that this policy was aimed at promoting the investment of local savings
in loco, supporting the less developed areas (Albareto and Trapanese, 1999). This argument, however, is based
on the wrong assumption that excess deposits cannot be ”recycled” in the interbank market, as it indeed
occurred. A second, more credible, interpretation has it that Donato Menichella (governor of the Bank of Italy
from 1948 to 1960) promoted the development of local banks at the expenses of national State-owned banks
”for the desire to see the power of the Central Bank vis-a-vis the banking system strengthened” (De Cecco,
1968, p. 67). De Cecco, however, is not entirely clear on the channel through which this relation worked.
5One possibility is that stronger national banks could acquire too much lobbying power vis-a-vis the Governor,
reducing his autonomy. Another possible channel is the institutional structure of the Bank of Italy. After 1936
the Bank of Italy was formally owned by the State-owned national banks and by the Savings banks, which
jointly elected the Central Bank’s Board. The Board nominated the Governor, who was subject to the approval
of the Government. Since the State-owned national banks were much more concentrated, by increasing the
power of the fragmented Savings banks, the Governor could play a ”divide et impera” strategy, to maximize his
autonomy. Regardless of the speciﬁc channel, however, this interpretation suggests that the hostility against
the big national bank was not determined by economic reasons, but was the result of a power struggle within
the Government bureaucracy. While both the previous arguments have some merits, we think that the main
reason for these policy biases is that the Christian Democratic party inherited the political clientele of the
Fascist Party, including the network of local notables and the right to direct Savings Banks’ donations to the
favorite charitable organizations. By inheriting this network, the Christian Democratic party inherited also
the Fascists’ party interest in promoting Savings Banks at the expenses of all the other types of banks. The
Savings Banks also maintained their advantageous position relatively to other local banks because they were
government owned. After the Second World War government banks were controlled by politics and especially
from the mid-ﬁfties the practice of political appointments of top executives in state-owned banks became the
way for politics to insure strong ties with the public banking system (Sapienza, 2000).
D The Deregulation Process
This regulatory system was maintained almost unchanged until the late 1980s. What triggered change was
the process of European integration and in particular the prospect of the application of the European Banking
Directive, mandating free entry, scheduled to be introduced in 1992. In anticipation of this change in 1986 the
procedure to open new bank oﬃces was eased. Instead of requiring an explicit authorization of the Bank of
Italy, the authorization was considered granted unless explicitly denied within 60 days from the request.
Entry was then entirely liberalized in 1990. In 1993 a new banking law (incorporating the Banking European
Directive) was approved. The separation between short and long-term lending was removed and banks were
allowed to underwrite security oﬀerings and own equity. The same year the legal structure of Savings Banks was
changed. From mutual organizations, they were transformed into standard corporations, facilitating acquisition
and mergers. Finally, in 1994 the Government started to privatize all the major State-owned banks.
6II Data Description
To capture diﬀerent aspects of the problem in this paper we use four diﬀerent dataset.
To measure the number of registered ﬁrms, their rate of formation, and the incidence of bankruptcy by
province we collected data coming from the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT) from a yearly edition of
”Il Sole 24 Ore”, a ﬁnancial newspaper. Table 2a reports summary statistics for these data. The Italian
territory is divided into 20 regions and each region is made up of a several provinces. Since new provinces
have been created over time, depending on the years considered we will be working either with the 93 province
classiﬁcation or with the one with 103 provinces.
The second dataset, containing information about households, is the Survey of Households Income and
Wealth (SHIW). This survey, which is conducted every two years by the Bank of Italy on a representative
sample of about 8,000 households, collects detailed information on Italian household income, consumption,
and wealth and portfolio allocation across ﬁnancial instruments. For each household, the data also contain
information on characteristics of the households’ head, such as education, age, place of birth, and residence.
An interesting feature of this survey is that each household is asked to report whether it faced any problem
in obtaining loans from ﬁnancial intermediaries. We use this information to create an indicator variable for
households that were rationed in the market either because were turned down or discouraged from borrowing.
Table 2b reports the summary statistics for this sample.
The third dataset draws data from the 1988-2001 Survey of Investment in Manufacturing Firms (SIM)
which is run yearly by the Bank of Italy on a sample of about 1,000 ﬁrms with at least 50 employees. The
main purpose of the survey is to collect information on ﬁrms ﬁxed investment, realized and planned for the
future. It also collects information on ﬁrms’ demographics and hiring and ﬁring decisions. Since 1988, the
Survey of Investment in manufacturing asks questions on access to the loans market similar to those asked to
households in the SHIW, allowing us to construct an indicator for whether the ﬁrm was rationed in the loans
market. Table 2c shows summary statistics for this dataset.
Finally, the fourth dataset contains ﬁnancial information about ﬁrms. It is from Centrale dei Bilanci
(CB), which provides standardized data on the balance sheets and income statements of about 30,000 Italian
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Data, available since 1982, are collected by a consortium of banks interested in pooling
information about their clients. A ﬁrm is included in the sample if it borrows from at least one of the banks
in the consortium. The database is highly representative of the Italian non-ﬁnancial sector: a report by
7Centrale dei Bilanci (1992), based on a sample of 12,528 companies drawn from the database (including only
the companies continuously present in 1982-90 and with sales in excess of 1 billion Lire in 1990), states that
this sample covers 57 percent of the sales reported in national accounting data. In particular, this dataset
contains a lot of small (less than 50 employees) and medium (between 50 and 250) ﬁrms
For some of the years prior to liberalization we have been able to have the CB data merged with the Credit
Register and thus obtain information on the interest rate charged by each bank (among those reporting to the
credit register which account for about 80% of total loans) that lends to the ﬁrms in our sample. In addition,
we can identify a number of characteristics of the lending banks, such as their size, proﬁtability and relevance
of non-performing loans, by linking the merged dataset to an additional database that contains information
on the banks balance sheets. Table 2d reports the summary statistics for these data.
III The Eﬀects of Banking Regulation on Competition
We want ﬁrst to establish that regulation of bank entry designed in 1936 aﬀected the working of the banking
industry before deregulation, i.e. until the late 1980s. To this purpose, we start by testing whether the
characteristics of the 1936 banking system have any impact on the structure of the banking industry along
two dimensions: the number of bank oﬃces and the level of interest rates.
To characterize the regional structure of the banking system in 1936 and thus the tightness of regulation we
use four indicators that are inspired by the 1936 anti-competitive regulation: (1) the number of bank branches
per 1000 inhabitants in the region in 1936 (regions with more branches in 1936 should have suﬀered less from
the freeze); (2) the share of bank branches owned by local banks over total branches in a region as of 1936 (the
higher this ratio the less binding should have been the CICR regulation); (3) the number of Savings banks
(the higher the number of Savings banks in 1936, the less tight the 1936 regulation was; and (4) the number
of cooperative banks per thousand inhabitants in the region in 1936 (conditional on the proportion of local
banks, cooperative banks were relatively disadvantaged in their ability to grow). If the 1936 law had any bite,
we should ﬁnd opposite eﬀects of these last two indicators.
8A Eﬀects on the number of bank oﬃces
To assess the eﬀects of diﬀerences in the bite of regulation on the level of the banking activity Table 3 regresses
the number of bank oﬃces in a province in 1985, before deregulation started, on the 1936 local bank structure.
As Table 3 column I shows, provinces with more bank branches per thousand inhabitants in 1936 also have
more bank branches per thousand inhabitants in 1985. This is hardly surprising, since it might simply reﬂect
that certain provinces are richer and so have more banks. But this eﬀect persists, albeit smaller, even after we
control for the logarithm of the value added per capita in the province (column II). Even this reduced eﬀect
is very noticeable quantitatively. A province that started with a level of bank branches per inhabitant one
standard deviation higher in 1936 had 17% more bank oﬃces per inhabitants in 1985.
More interestingly, the proportion of bank oﬃces controlled by local banks in 1936 aﬀects the number of
bank oﬃces present in 1985. As we said, local banks were given more room to expand locally compared to
national banks. This could explain why the total number of bank oﬃces increased more in provinces where in
1936 the banking market was dominated by local banks. This eﬀect is also quantitatively large. One standard
deviation increase in the fraction of branches controlled by local banks in 1936 leads to a 6 percentage points
increase in the number of bank branches per inhabitants in 1985 (a 20% increase).
As we said, among local banks the 1936 law granted more room to expand to Savings Banks, rather than
to cooperative banks. Once we control for the fraction of branches controlled by local banks this distinction
does not seem to make a big diﬀerence. As expected, in column I the coeﬃcient on the number of cooperative
banks is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, but when we insert the log of the GDP per capita the signiﬁcance
disappears.
These four variables that summarize the structure of the banking system in 1936 can explain 27 percent
of the provincial variation in the number of bank branches before liberalization. Importantly, this eﬀect is
not just a North-South divide. While ceteris paribus Southern provinces have fewer bank oﬃces (see column
III of Table 3), the level of bank oﬃces per inhabitant and the proportion of local banks remain statistically
signiﬁcant after we insert a South dummy.
B Eﬀect on the Cost of Credit
The second aspect we investigate is the eﬀect of the 1936 law on the cost of credit. Table 4 presents some
estimates using the matched ﬁrms-bank register data that allow us to obtain a measure of the interest rate
9on credit lines charged by each of the banks lending to a given ﬁrms. Since we do not have data for the
year 1985 we use data for the 1991, the earliest available year, before many of the liberalization steps were
undertaken. This assumption is supported by Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) who by using bank-level balance
sheets, convincingly show that mark ups in the Italian banking industry remained unchanged until 1992, and
declined only after the liberalization started to unfold.
The dependent variable is the interest rate charged by each bank to each client. To control for diﬀerences
in riskiness across ﬁrms we insert a ﬁrm’s return on sales, its leverage, and its size (measured as log sales) as
explanatory variables. In addition, we also control for the Altman Z-score, which captures the probability of
bankruptcy, where a larger score value reﬂects a higher probability of default. This score is computed by CB
and is used by the banks belonging to the CB consortium to price their loans. Finally, we control for three
bank characteristics – size, share of non-performing loans and return on assets – which capture diﬀerences in
bank’s market power and eﬃciency that may be reﬂected in interest rates on loans.
The ﬁrst two columns show that the loan rates paid by ﬁrms are aﬀected by the bottlenecks created by
the 1936 law. The strongest eﬀect is due to Savings banks. In provinces where Savings banks were more in
1936, we observe a lower spread between loans and deposits in 1991. By contrast ﬁrms in provinces where
cooperative banks were more diﬀuse in 1936 have ceteris paribus higher lending rate in the 1980s.
These eﬀects are also economically signiﬁcant. One standard deviation increase in the number of savings
bank per million inhabitants in 1936 reduces the lending rate by 239 basis points, while one standard deviation
increase in the number of cooperative banks in increases the lending rate by 157 basis points. Demirg¨ u¸ c-
Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2003) also ﬁnd that banking regulation increases the cost of credit using cross
country variation. However, they also ﬁnd that this eﬀect disappears once they control for national indicators
of property rights protection, leading them to argue that banking regulation reﬂects broader features of a
country approach to competition. Our approach, based on within country variation in the bite of regulation,
is able to separate the eﬀect of banking regulation on the cost of credit from other institutional features which
are automatically controlled for.
One potential problem is that the bank controls are few and the characteristics of 1936 banking structure
may be capturing unobserved bank characteristics that are relevant for interest rate setting, such as eﬃciency.
Since the same bank lends to multiple ﬁrms in diﬀerent provinces we can account for unobservable bank
characteristics by adding bank ﬁxed eﬀect. When we do this in columns III and IV results are similar to those
10in the ﬁrst two columns.
In sum, the restrictions on entry imposed by the 1936 legislation seem to have substantially aﬀected the
degree of local competition in the banking industry until the end of the 1980s. Having established this, we
can now study the eﬀect of this lack of competition on the allocation of credit and, ultimately, on economic
growth. To do so, however, we need to construct a meaningful measure of the degree competition of the local
credit markets before deregulation and show that this measure of competition diﬀers depending on how strong
was the eﬀect of the 1936 regulation on the various local markets. Only after doing so can we analyze the real
impact of competition, using the structure of local credit markets in 1936 as instruments.
C Measuring competition in local credit markets
As a measure of competition we use a bank’s ability to charge its clients above its marginal cost (i.e., its
spread or mark up over the deposit rate).2 We use the CB data merged with the credit register to compute
the mark-up on deposit rates that a bank can charge to a given ﬁrm. This is computed by subtracting the
average rate on deposits in a province from the interest rate on the loans paid by the ﬁrm. Diﬀerences in this
spread could be due to diﬀerences in banks’ market power or diﬀerences in the riskiness of local borrowers.
In order to isolate the ﬁrst eﬀect from the second, we run regressions where we control for a number of
indicators that capture ﬁrms quality: the ﬁrm return on sales, its leverage (as a proxy for ﬁnancial fragility),
its size (measured by log assets) which captures the fact that smaller ﬁrms are more likely to fail, and the
ﬁrm propensity score. For our purposes of controlling for the ﬁrm risk, the latter is a particularly important
variable. It is directly computed by the CB in order to obtain a synthetic indicator of the probability of default.
This score is than used by the banks that belong to the CB consortium to decide whether to grant a loan and
to price it. It is likely, thus, to capture most of the information on which banks condition for assessing ﬁrms’
risk.
Besides controlling for these ﬁrm characteristics we also include several bank controls: the size of the
lending banks (measured by log assets), its returns on assets, the ratio of non-performing loans on total loans
outstanding, and dummies for state or local government bank ownership (the ﬁrst dummy is equal to 1 if the
bank is a Savings bank, the second is equal to 1 if the bank is state-owned). These variables may aﬀect the
loan rate as they capture diﬀerences across banks that are not picked up by the average deposit rate in a
2The reason why most studies use a Herﬁndhal index of loans or deposits is that they do not have access to the bank-ﬁrm data
we have access to. Our measure speaks more directly to the eﬀective market power banks have at a local level.
11province. For example, state-ownership of banks aﬀect the lending rate, as state owned bank subsidize loans
3; similarly, bank proﬁtability and non-performing loans aﬀect the bank’s cost of raising funds.
To measure diﬀerences in the competition across local markets we insert a full set of dummies, one for
each Italian province for a total of 96 dummies and take the coeﬃcient on the province dummy as a measure
of the market power enjoyed by the banks lending in that market. The presumption is that the province – a
geographical unit close in size to a US county – is the relevant local market. There are two reasons why this
assumption is reasonable. First, according to the Italian Antitrust authority the ”relevant market” in banking
for antitrust purposes is the province. Second, this is also the deﬁnition the Central Bank used until 1990 to
decide whether to authorize the opening of new branches.
To transform the measure of market power into an indicator of the degree of competition in the local
credit markets we compute Competition = max(coeﬃcient on provincial dummies) – (coeﬃcient on provincial
dummies) so that the least competitive local market is standardized to zero and the units of the measure
of competition are deviations of the interest rate spread from the province where it is largest. Obviously, if
provincial markets were not geographically segmented – e.g. because ﬁrms could indiﬀerently borrow in any
local market and could thus arbitrage away diﬀerences in lending rates – the coeﬃcients on the provincial
dummies should not diﬀer from each other. Thus, ﬁnding that these coeﬃcients are indeed diﬀerent can be
regarded as a test of local market segmentation. The F statistics for the hypothesis that the province eﬀects
are equal to zero is 7,556.35 ( p-value = 0.0000), suggesting signiﬁcant geographical dispersion in banking
competition.
Table 5, Panel A, lists our measure of local market competition sorting provinces from the least to the most
competitive one. The range of variation implies that in the most competitive province (Ravenna) the interest
rate spread is, ceteris paribus, 363 basis points lower than in the least competitive province (Catanzaro) while
in the median province the spread is 192 basis points lower than in the least competitive. The magnitude of
these ﬁgures implies that prior to liberalization local credit markets were markedly segmented.
Figure 1 shows visually how banking competition diﬀers across local credit markets. While a North-South
divide is a clear feature of the data, there is considerable variation in the degree of competition suggesting
that one can rely on variation within the Center-North and the South to identify the eﬀect of competition on
banking outcomes.
3See Sapienza (2004).
12Table 5, panel B, shows how diﬀerences in the tightness of the 1936 regulation across regions has aﬀected
banking competition. The ﬁrst column regresses our measure of competition on the four indicators of 1936
regulation. In areas with more local banks and more savings banks and thus with less restricted opportunities
to compete in local markets, interest rate spreads are lower. A one standard deviation increase in the number
of bank oﬃces belonging to local banks in 1936 lowers the spread by 18 basis points while a one standard
deviation increase in the number of savings banks per capita lowers the spread by 22 basis points. The number
of cooperative banks has, as expected a negative impact on the degree of competition in the local credit market
but is not statistically signiﬁcant and similarly the number of bank oﬃces in 1936 has a positive eﬀect but
not statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, these 1936 variables explain 27 percent of the variation in the degree of
competition 50 years later. The hypothesis that they are joint signiﬁcantly equal to zero can be rejected at
conventional level of signiﬁcance, as shown by the value of the F-test.
The second column shows results when the two insigniﬁcant variables in the ﬁrst regression are dropped; the
amount of variation explained falls to 22 percent but remains substantial even if only these two characteristics
of the 1936 banking structure are used to predict competition. The F-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of
these two variables raises to 14.24.
In the third column we regress our competition index on the indicator of local credit market development
constructed by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), based on the ease of access to credit. These two measures
are highly, but imperfectly, correlated suggesting that cost and availability of credit are two separate aspects
of a credit market.
IV The Eﬀects of Restrictions on Bank Competition
In the previous section we have shown how the peculiarities of the Italian Banking Law of 1936 aﬀected the
degree of bank competition at the provincial level. This link allows us to treat the component of the variation
in bank competition explained by the 1936 law as a random treatment. Hence, we can study how arbitrary
variations in the degree of competition across otherwise identical provinces can aﬀect the allocation of credit
and, ultimately, economic performance. To this purpose, we will look at the eﬀect of competition on a number
of indicators of banking and economic performance. Interestingly, we can do this exercise both for the regulated
period and for the deregulation period. We start with the regulated period.
13A Eﬀects of Restrictions on Competition on the Supply of Loans
Limits to competition induced by regulation could restraint the supply of loans and access to credit. We
explore this issue by looking at the eﬀect of competition on the aggregate volume of loans and on the degree
of rationing.
Table 6 shows the eﬀect of our measure of competition on the ratio between loans and value added at the
provincial level. If we regress this ratio on our measure of competition alone (column I), there seems to be
a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on loans supply. Increasing competition by one standard deviation raises the
loans/value added ratio in a province by 2.76 percentage points. This eﬀect, however, is not robust to the
introduction of a South dummy and to controlling for provincial value added per capita, as shown in columns II
and III. In fact, the coeﬃcient becomes negative albeit not statistically signiﬁcant. Instrumenting competition
with the 1936 proxies for regulation raises the point estimate, but it remains not statistically signiﬁcant. This
result is consistent with Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), who ﬁnd that the deregulation of the banking sector
in the United States (which increased competition) did not in case the quantity of loans, but only the quality.
Table 7 looks at the impact of competition on the availability of credit. Panel A deals with household’s
rationing, while Panel B with ﬁrm’s rationing. In Panel A we use the two earliest households” surveys available
1989-91 that clearly belong to the pre-liberalization period. Since each year of the Survey of Investment in
Manufacturing only includes 1,000 ﬁrms and since the fraction of rationed ﬁrms in normal times is small
(around 2.5-3 percent of the sample), in order to obtain suﬃcient information to carry the estimates, in Panel
B we pool the surveys for the earlier years starting in 1988 (the ﬁrst year the rationing question was asked) and
until1995 (when liberalization experienced an acceleration as universal banking started to be implemented); this
interval include the 1993-1995 recession when the share of rationed ﬁrms peaked to 13 percent (in 1993).Since
competition varies only at the province level, standard errors are adjusted for provincial clustering.
Panel A, Column I shows that in a OLS regression more competition lowers the probability that a household
is rationed.4 This eﬀect is not only statistically signiﬁcant but is economically important: raising competition
by one standard deviation lowers the probability a household is rationed by about 20 percent of the sample
4The rationing variable is equal to 1 if a household was denied credit or was discouraged from applying over the year and relies
on the following two questions asked in the SHIW: ”During the year did you or a member of the household apply for a loan or a
mortgage from a bank or other ﬁnancial intermediary and was your application turned down?” and ”During the year did you or a
member of the household think of applying for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other ﬁnancial intermediary, but then changed
your mind on the expectation that the application would have been turned down?”. We create the variable ”rationed” equals to
one if a household responds positively to at least one of the two questions reported above and zero otherwise.
14mean. The second column instruments the degree of competition with the four indicators of the 1936 banking
structure. The estimated eﬀect of competition retains its statistical signiﬁcance and is more than twice as
large: a one standard deviation increase in competition lowers the probability that a household is shut oﬀ
from the credit market by 50 percent of the sample mean. This result is true even controlling for several
households’ characteristics: household income, household wealth (linear and squared), household head’s age,
his/her education (number of years of schooling), the number of people belonging to the household, the number
of kids, and indicator variables for whether the head is married, is a male, for the industry in which he/she
works, for the level of job he/she has and the size of the town or city were the individual lives. To capture
possible local diﬀerences in the riskiness of potential borrowers we control in this regression for the percentage
of ﬁrms that go bankrupt in the province (average of the 1992-1995 period). We also add to the regression the
percentage of non-performing loans on total loans in the province; this control should eliminate the potentially
spurious eﬀects of over lending.5 The estimate is left unchanged by the insertion of a South dummy, as shown
in the last column.
Panel B reports the estimates for ﬁrms rationing.6 We control for ﬁrm size (the log of employment), nature
of ownership (state owned or private), whether the ﬁrm is hiring or ﬁring workers (to proxy for perceived future
growth opportunities), the investment/sales ratio, and the share of sales abroad. Regressions also include a
full set of year dummies to account for the business cycles and contractions/expansions in money supply. The
OLS estimate of the eﬀect of competition on the probability that the ﬁrm is turned down (totally or partially)
when applying for a loan is negative but its eﬀect is small and is not statistically signiﬁcant. Instrumenting
competition with the 1936 variables results in a much larger and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimate.
A one standard deviation increase in competition lowers the probability that a ﬁrm is rationed by about two
percentage points, equivalent to 43 percent of the sample mean. The last column shows that this result is not
due to a correlation of our competition proxy with the North-South divide: adding a South dummy leaves in
fact results unchanged.
5If in certain areas banks lend excessively (i.e., even to non creditworthy individuals), it would be easier to have access to credit,
but we can hardly claim this reﬂects a better functioning local market for loans. The percentage of non performing loans should
eliminate this potential spurious eﬀect.
6In the Survey of Investment in Manufacturing ﬁrms are asked three questions: a) ”In the previous year, at the interest rate
that was prevailing in the market did your ﬁrm want a larger volume of loans?” b) ”Was your ﬁrm willing to pay a slightly higher
interest rate in order to obtain the extra loan?” c) ”Did your ﬁrm apply for the obtaining more loans but was turned down?”.
These three questions, which mirror the questions asked in a Bank of Italy SHIW, can be used to identify credit rationed ﬁrms.
We deﬁned as rationed all ﬁrms that applied and were turned down, i.e. all those that answered ”yes” to question (c). This is the
indicator we use as left hand side variable in Table 7b.
15These results are inconsistent with Petersen and Rajan (1995) who predict that more oligopolist markets
ease the access to credit of the more risky (marginal) ﬁrms, because a lender with market power can recoup
the cost of lending over time. Petersen and Rajan ﬁnd evidence consistent with their hypothesis by using
variation in the degree of competition across U.S. regional markets. The diﬀerence in the results can probably
be attributed to two factors. First, Petersen and Rajan does not have any instrument for diﬀerences in
competition. When we do not instrument, our coeﬃcient is basically zero. Second, our dataset does not
contain the really small ﬁrms, which are the most likely to be rationed. That we ﬁnd the same eﬀect with
household, however, speaks against this second interpretation.
B Eﬀects of Restrictions on Competition on the Eﬃcient Allocation of Credit
The 1936 banking law purposefully restricted competition with the goal of increasing bank stability. The
underlying idea was that “excessive” competition will lead to an increase in the fraction of bad loans, with
adverse consequences on the stability of the banking sector.
In Table 8 we test this hypothesis. Our dependent variable is the proportion of bad loans to total loans
in a province (in percentage terms) during the pre-deregulation period. Since we have data starting only in
1984, as a measure of the pre-deregulation period we use the average 1984-1986. We compute this ratio both
in terms of number of loans (ﬁrst ﬁve columns) and in terms of quantity of loans (second ﬁve columns). Since
the results are virtually identical, we will comment only the ﬁrst measure.
If we regress the proportion of bad loans on our measure of competition alone (column I), there seems to
be no eﬀect. But once we control for the North-South divide (column II) and even more so for diﬀerences
in income per capita (column III), higher competition appears to be associated with more bad loans. One
standard deviation increase in competition increases the proportion of bad loans from 2.6% to 2.8% (a 20%
increase). This result is consistent with Beck et al. (2003), who ﬁnd that banking crises are less likely in more
concentrated banking markets.
To address potential endogeneity questions, in column IV we instrument competition with our four indica-
tors of the banking structure in 1936. Not only the coeﬃcient remains statistically signiﬁcant, but quadruple
in size. If we accept the IV estimates, thus, the eﬀect is quite sizeable: one standard deviation increase in
competition increases the proportion of bad loans from 2.6% to 3.2% (a 75% increase).
16C Eﬀects of Restrictions on Competition on Number of Firms and Aggregate Growth
The previous estimates have shown both costs and beneﬁts of bank competition.
More competition increases access to credit but it also increases the percentage of bad loans. What is the
overall impact?
To address this question we turn to real economic variables. We analyze the impact of the degree of bank
competition on the number of ﬁrms present in a province and the aggregate rate of growth of a province. If
banking regulation, by limiting competition, aﬀects the availability of loans it should also aﬀect the number
of ﬁrms operating in a given area and the rate at which existing ﬁrms are able to grow, and thus the level of
aggregate regional growth.
In Table 9 panel A we regress the number of ﬁrms present in a province per 100 people living in the same
area on a set of provincial control and our measure of bank competition.7
Column I shows that provinces with higher levels of GDP per capita have more ﬁrms per 100 inhabitants. In
Column II we add our measure of banking competition in the province to this speciﬁcation. This has a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of ﬁrms but the economic eﬀect is small: a one standard
deviation increase in the degree of competition increases the number of ﬁrms by 0.33 per 100 inhabitants
in the province. However, when we instrument competition with the variables that describes the structure
of the local banking market as of 1936 we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of competition becomes almost six times as
large suggesting a very strong impact of bank competition on entrepreneurship. A one standard deviation
increase in bank competition increases the number of ﬁrms in that province by 20 percent. This eﬀect is
consistent with our previous ﬁnding of a positive eﬀect of bank competition on the availability of credit. This
result is also consistent with Black and Strahan (2001) who ﬁnd that in the U.S. competition in the banking
market is associated with higher level of new incorporations because banking competition leads to more credit
availability.
In Panel B of Table 9 we test the eﬀect of bank competition on aggregate growth. We measure growth as
the rate of growth of per capita GDP in a province between 1951 and 1991 (i.e, the pre-deregulation period).
Per capita GDP is the per capita net disposable income in the province in million liras. As in the standard
growth regression (Barro, 1991) we control for the initial (i.e., 1951) GDP per capita in the province. In
addition, we control for the preexisting level of infrastructure (deﬁned as the sum of all the infrastructural
7Ideally, we would like the number of ﬁrms in 1990. Unfortunately, we were able to ﬁnd only the data for 1996-1998, hence we
use the average of these three years. The problem is not so severe because the number of ﬁrms does not change so rapidly.
17investments in the period 1936-1951 divided by the 1951 GDP per capita), and for the South dummy.
In column IV we insert, in addition to all these controls, our measure of bank competition. The coeﬃcient
is positive, but it is not statistically signiﬁcant. But if we instrument bank competition with our proxies for
exogenous restrictions on entry, we ﬁnd that the degree of bank competition signiﬁcantly aﬀects GDP growth
rate of a province. Increasing competition by one standard deviation raises real economic growth by a quarter
of a percentage point per year. Almost half of the 60 basis points of diﬀerence in growth rate between the
Center-North and the South can be explained by the diﬀerence in the level of bank competition in these two
areas.
D How the Starting Level of Competition Aﬀects the Impact of Deregulation
By looking at the long-term eﬀects of regulatory restrictions, in the previous section we have shown that
bank competition has positive economic eﬀects, except for an increase in the percentage of bad loans. An
independent validation of the causal nature of this relationship comes from analyzing what happens when
these restrictions are removed. If the previously observed economic costs are really due to the lack of local
bank competition, after deregulation we should observe a catching up of those areas where the banking market
was less competitive during the regulation period.
This analysis of the eﬀects of deregulation as a function of the pre-existing level of competition is interesting
also from another point of view. Many developing countries have liberalized their banking market without a
full understanding of what the cost and beneﬁts of the transition are. This analysis can give us a sense of
these costs and beneﬁts as a function of the starting conditions.
E Eﬀects of Deregulation on the Supply of Loans
To study the eﬀect of deregulation on the supply of credit to households in Table 10a we pool the two earliest
surveys (1989 and 1991) with the two latest ones (1999-2001) and test the eﬀect of the initial level of competition
on access to credit at a time of deregulation.
As Column I shows, deregulation brings a signiﬁcant reduction in the number of households shut oﬀ from
the credit market (1.9% of all the households, equal to a reduction of 73% of the shut oﬀ households). Once
again this eﬀect cannot be attributed solely to deregulation because many other things change at the same
time. Nevertheless, it is hard to ﬁnd any other plausible explanation for a reduction of this size.
18As in Table 7a, households located in provinces with more bank competition are less likely to be shut oﬀ
from the credit market.
What Table 10a adds is that this eﬀect disappears entirely after deregulation. Not only the coeﬃcient of
the interaction between competition and deregulation is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, but its magnitude
is almost exactly identical to the coeﬃcient of competition alone. As expected, thus, deregulation makes all
local markets equally competitive, eliminating the eﬀect of the initial conditions.
As column II shows, these results are robust to insert a South dummy. Similarly, column III shows that
they are robust to instrumenting our measure of competition with the characteristics of the credit market in
1936.
In Table 10b we perform a similar type of analysis with the ﬁrms’ sample. We re-estimate the speciﬁcation
in Table 7b pooling also the surveys after 1995 (de facto the surveys for the years 1998 and 2001).
As in Table 10a we insert year dummies and an interaction between our measure of competition and a
liberalization dummy equal to 1 for the years 1998-2001. The pattern of the results is similar to the one
seen in Table 10a, but the eﬀect is weaker. While the competition variable remains negative and statistically
signiﬁcant and the interaction term is positive, the latter is not statistically signiﬁcant and its size is an order
of magnitude smaller than the coeﬃcient of competition alone.
One possible interpretation of these results is that there is not suﬃcient information in the data to estimate
precisely both eﬀects given the size of the sample (each survey only includes 1,000 ﬁrms) and the small fraction
of rationed ﬁrms in normal times (around 2.5-3 percent). The pre-deregulation period includes the 1993-1995
recession when the share of rationed ﬁrms peaked to 13 percent, while there is no similar recession in the post
deregulation period. Hence, the higher magnitude of the coeﬃcient and its statistical signiﬁcance before but
not after might simply be due to this asymmetry in the data.
An alternative interpretation, however, is that the eﬀect of deregulation is more immediate on household
credit than on business lending. This makes sense since it is much easier to create ex novo a consumer lending
department and ﬁnd clients (given the high number of rationed households) than to initiate new relationship
with ﬁrms. The expertise associated to business lending is also more diﬃcult to improvise.
If we accept this interpretation, this result carries an important implication for the eﬀect of bank liber-
alization: consumer spending might react faster than business investments to the increased supply of credit.
This interpretation is consistent with Ayoumi (1993), who ﬁnds that consumption behavior is deeply aﬀected
19by ﬁnancial liberalization in England in the 1980s.
F Eﬀects of Deregulation on the Eﬃcient Allocation of Credit
Table 6 showed that provinces with more bank competition experienced a higher fraction of bad loans during
the regulation period. How does the fraction of bad loan respond to the increase in competition generated by
deregulation? We look at this in Table 11. As a measure of the percentage of bad loans after deregulation we
use the average of 1999-2000 (the last year in our data). Our dependent variable is the diﬀerence between this
variable and the pre-deregulation level of bad loans, measured as in Table 6. For ease of read, the diﬀerence
is multiplied by 100, so it is expressed in percentage points.
Interestingly, after deregulation the percentage of bad loans dropped, more in quantity (from 3.1% to 2.5%)
than in number (from 2.6 to 2.4%). We cannot, however, attribute this eﬀect just to deregulation. Since, unlike
in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), deregulation occurs simultaneously across the diﬀerent provinces, we cannot
separate the eﬀect of deregulation from other business cycle eﬀects.
We can, however, study how this drop in percentage of bad loans relates to the initial level of competition
in the local banking market. This is what we do in Table 11. In the ﬁrst column we show that the drop in
the percentage of bad loans is particularly pronounced in provinces that started the deregulation period more
competitive. One interpretation of this result is that local competition forced bank oﬃcers to be more skillful
in lending and this superior skill reduced the percentage of bad loans. Another interpretation is that in more
competitive areas, the percentage of bad loans was already high to begin with and so did not increase as much
(or decreased more) after deregulation.
If we look at the magnitude of the eﬀect, however, the second explanation seems to be insuﬃcient. During
regulation one standard deviation increase in competition increased the proportion of bad loans by 20 basis
points. After deregulation one standard deviation increase in the initial level of competition decreased the
proportion of bad loans by 54 basis points. Hence, the proportion of bad loans in non competitive areas not
only catches up to the level of competitive area, but exceeds it by 34 basis points. This suggests that lack of
competition has long lasting eﬀect on banks ability to lend, which persist even after deregulation has taken
place.
As columns II and III suggest, the eﬀect of the initial level of competition is not just a North-South eﬀect
and it is not driven by diﬀerences in the GDP per capita. When we instrument competition with the structure
20of the banking industry in 1936, the eﬀect is much bigger in magnitude (one standard deviation increase in
competition decrease the proportion of bad loans by 134 basis points). The pattern is very similar if we use
the proportion of bad loans in terms of quantity rather than in terms of numbers (columns V to VIII).
G Eﬀects of Deregulation on Number of Firms and Aggregate Growth
As for the level of regulation, we ﬁnd that deregulation has both positive and negative eﬀects: the supply of
loans increases but so does the percentage of bad loans. To assess the overall welfare eﬀect we resort, once
again, to study the impact of deregulation on some real measures: the growth rate in the number of ﬁrms and
the aggregate growth rate.
In Table 12 panel A we regress the number of new ﬁrms in a province per 100 people living in the same
area (average of 1996-98) on a set of provincial control and our measure of bank competition at the beginning
of deregulation.
Column I shows that provinces with higher levels of GDP per capita seem to have more creation of new
ﬁrms, but this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. Sourthern regions experience less ﬁrm creation. In Column
II we add our measure of banking competition in the province to this speciﬁcation. This has a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the creation of new ﬁrms after deregulation. This is somewhat surprising. We
would expect that the initial level of competition had no eﬀect or even possibly a negative eﬀect, since with
deregulation the other regions are catching up to the level of ﬁrm creation prevailing in the areas that started
more competitive. This eﬀect persists when we instrument competition with the variables that describes the
structure of the local banking market as of 1936. Hence, it is not spurious.
While surprising, this result is consistent with our ﬁndings on the supply of credit. Deregulation does not
have an immediate impact on the supply of credit to ﬁrms and hence does not have an immediate impact on
the creation of new ﬁrms.
In Panel B of Table 12 we want to capture the eﬀect of deregulation on the aggregate growth rate. If we
start from the standard growth regression used in Table 9b
Growthit = αlog(GDP) it−1 + βCompetitionit + γSouthi + δIit + εit
where ”i” indexes the region and ”t” the time, then the eﬀect of deregulation can be assessed by taking the
ﬁrst diﬀerence between this equation before and after deregulation. Assuming that after deregulation all the
areas achieve a similar level of competition that we set equal to zero, and denoting Competitionib the index
21of competition in region i before deregulation, we have
∆Growthit = α∆log(GDP) it−1 − βCompetitionib + δ∆Iit + ∆εit
Panel B of Table 12 runs this regression. We take the diﬀerence in the average growth rate after deregulation
(period 1991-1999) and the average growth rate before (period 1951 -1991). We regress this on the diﬀerence
in the log of the per capita GDP at the beginning of deregulation (1991) and the log of the per capita GDP at
the beginning gof the regulation period (1951). As we can see from column I, areas that started with a more
competitive banking sector grows relatively less during the deregulation period. Hence, deregulation allows
less competitive areas to catch up. This eﬀect is present even if we control for the change in the initial level
of infrastructural investments (diﬀerence in infrastructural investment is the diﬀerence between the sum of all
the infrastructural investments before deregulation (1951-1991) divided by the 1991 GDP per capita and the
sum of all the infrastructural investments before the regulation period (1936-1951) divided by the 1951 GDP
per capita). The eﬀect doubles in magnitude when we instrument our measure of competition with the 1936
banking structure variables.
Hence, while the eﬀect of deregulation is not felt immediately on the entry of new ﬁrms, it is felt right
away on the growth rate.
V Conclusions
In spite of the pervasiveness of bank regulation throughout the world, there is precious little evidence of its
welfare eﬀects. By using some exogenous variation in the extent of restrictions on competition, this paper is
able to assess both the costs and beneﬁts of regulation and the cost and beneﬁts of deregulation.
We ﬁnd that restrictions to competition reduce the supply of credit but also reduce the percentage of bad
loans. By contrast, deregulation increases the supply of credit and increases the percentage of bad loans.
Overall, restrictions on competition have negative eﬀects on aggregate growth, eﬀects that are undone when
bank regulation is lifted. We also ﬁnd that in areas where competition was restricted, after deregulation the
percentage of bad loans raises above the level of competitive areas, suggesting that lack of competition has a
long lasting eﬀect on a bank ability to grant credit in an eﬃcient way.
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26Table 1. Number of banks and bank branches:1936-1974
The table reports the number of banks and bank branches in 1936 and 1974 divided by type of banks. Source: Bank of Italy.
Number of bank branches
in 1936 in 1985 % change 1936-85
National state-owned banks 1542 2623 70.10%
Savings Banks 1448 3643 151.59%
Cooperatives 1161 2555 120.07%
Others 2121 2898 36.63%
Total 6272 11719 86.85%
Number of banks
in 1936 in 1985 % change 1936-85
National state-owned banks 8 9 12.50%
Savings Banks 91 73 -19.78%
Cooperatives 329 86 -73.86%
Others 1590 97 -93.90%
Total 2018 265 -86.87%
27Table 2. Summary statistics for the samples used in estimation
Panel A reports summary statistics of the major characteristics of each province. Panel B reports summary statistics for the
households in the SHIW for the surveys 1989, 1991, 1998, and 2000. Panel C does the same for ﬁrms from SIM. Panel D shows
summary statistics for the matched ﬁrms-banks dataset used to estimate banks mark up on the deposit rate. In Panel B credit
rationed is a dummy variable equal to one if a household responds positively to at least one of the following questions: ”During the
year did you or a member of the household think of applying for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other ﬁnancial intermediary, but
then changed your mind on the expectation that the application would have been turned down?;” ”During the year did you or a
member of the household apply for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other ﬁnancial intermediary and your application was turned
down?.” Age is the age of the household head in the household sample and the age of the individual in the individual sample. Male
is a dummy variable equal to one if the household head or the individual is a male. ”Years of education” is the number of years
a person attended school. Net disposable income is in millions liras. Wealth is real wealth of the household. South is a dummy
equal to one if the household lives in a region South of Rome. Per capita GDP is the per capita net disposable income in the
province in millions of liras in 1990. GDP per capita in 1951 is the 1951 per capita value added in the province expressed in 1990
liras. Judicial ineﬃciency is the number of years it takes to have a ﬁrst-degree judgment in the province. Number of ﬁrms present
per 100 people living in the same area (average of 1996-98, source ISTAT). In Panel C credit rationed is a dummy equal to one if
the ﬁrm has applied for a loan during the year preceding the interview and was either turned down or unable to obtain the full
amount required; employees is the number of employees measured at the ﬁrm level. In Panel D interest rate minus deposit rate is
the diﬀerence between the ﬁrm level interest rate on credit lines charged by each bank lending to the ﬁrm minus the average rate
on deposits in the province were the lending bank is located; return on sales is ﬁrm proﬁts divides by sales; leverage is ﬁrms total
debt as a share of ﬁrm’s liabilities; size is the log of ﬁrm’s assets; score is a ﬁrm propensity score computed by the CB; size of the
bank is the log of the assets of the lending bank; non performing loans is the total value of non-performing loans of the lending
bank as a percentage share of its outstanding loans; return on assets of the bank is the share of lending bank proﬁts to total bank
assets.
28Panel A:
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Bank branches per millions inhabitants (1985) 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.04 1.15 95
Index of competition 1.91 1.94 0.75 0.00 3.63 95
Fraction of bank oﬃces owned by local banks (1936) 0.76 0.74 0.15 0.46 0.97 95
Number of savings banks per million inhabitants (1936) 2.72 2.05 2.92 0.00 11.98 95
Number of cooperative banks per million inhabitants (1936) 8.60 7.57 5.62 0.00 21.66 95
Bank oﬃces per million inhabitants (1936) 0.21 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.53 95
# of bad loans/total # of loans (1985) 2.59 2.51 0.83 1.04 5.07 95
Quantity of bad loans over total quantity of loans (1985) 3.14 2.81 1.78 0.78 11.28 95
Ratio of loans to GDP (1985) 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.02 1.29 95
Log GDP per capita in 1951 8.19 8.21 0.33 7.65 9.03 95
Log GDP per capita in 1991 9.43 9.52 0.26 8.89 9.83 95
Social capital 0.80 0.83 0.08 0.60 0.92 95
Growth rate in value added per capita between 1951 and 1999 (
Total investment in public infrastructure 1926-1951/ value added 1951 1.52 1.44 0.84 0.17 3.62 95
South dummy 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 95
Number of ﬁrms per 100 inhabitants in 1995 (obs=103) 9.19 9.03 1.55 5.97 13.55 103
Panel B:
Mean Median Std. Dev. 1st 99th Obs.
Credit rationed 0.026179 0 0.159669 0 1 47,748
Financial liabilities 0.644576 0 5.113731 0 10 47,748
Number of people living in the household 2.952564 3 1.356721 1 6 47,748
Age 53.54373 53 15.20849 25 86 47,748
Net disposable income (10 million lire) 4.281415 3.49374 3.414256 0.54 16.07994 47,748
Net disposable income (squared) 29.98741 12.20622 121.7991 0.2916 258.5644 47,748
Net real wealth (10 million lire) 21.23139 11.4 43.76575 0 162.4 47,748
Net real wealth (squared) 2366.173 129.96 67064.46 0 26373.76 47,748
Size of the town 2.452836 3 0.984335 1 4 47,748
Years of schooling 8.389168 8 4.682775 0 18 47,748
Dummy if male 0.755906 1 0.429553 0 1 47,748
Dummy if married 0.726921 1 0.445546 0 1 47,748
29Panel C:
Mean Median Std. Dev. 1st 99th Obs.
Credit rationed 0.0451232 0 0.207581 0 1 14,565
Dummy=1 if state-owned 0.04144828 0 0.199331 0 1 14,565
Log of sales 5.459437 5.32301 1.238917 3.135494 8.908965 14,565
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm has hired workers during the year 0.43165251 0 0.495322 0 1 14,565
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm has ﬁred workers during the year 0.48966805 0 0.499908 0 1 14,565
Ratio of investment over sales at t − 1 0.13833931 0.03344481 5.682062 0 0.476459 14,565
Employees 675.35961 205 2939.194 23 7398 14,565
Panel D:
Mean Median Std. Dev. 1st 99th Obs.
Interest rate minus deposit rate 1.950231 1.415647 2.528095 -1.61566 10.25854 37538
Return on sales 8.682313 7.935716 7.078794 -8.37142 33.26308 37238
Leverage 66.57482 69.36 18.72835 12.4 97.67 37286
Size 9.927334 9.784704 1.386472 7.003066 13.97307 37538
Score measuring the probability of default 3.933134 4 1.671317 1 7 37538
Located in the South 0.176914 0 0.381601 0 1 37538
Size of the bank 10.31674 10.67667 1.116506 7.521859 11.68105 37538
Percentage of non-performing loans of the bank 14.87396 8.4 18.65453 0 90.47 37471
Return on assets of the bank 0.454587 0.40833 0.263825 0.050715 1.164295 37538
30Table 3. Eﬀects of the 1936 banking regulation on the banking structure
before deregulation
The dependent variable is the number of bank oﬃces per 1000 inhabitants in 1985. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are
adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at less than 1%; (**): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 1%; (*): coeﬃcient
signiﬁcant at the 5%. A constant is also included in the regressions (coeﬃcient not reported).
Number of bank oﬃces on population
I II III
Fraction of bank oﬃces owned 0.431** 0.365** 0.325*
by local banks in 1936 (0.166) (0.172) (0.181)
Number of savings banks per 1000 -1.359 -2.942 -3.841
inhabitants in the region in 1936 (4.769) (5.883) (5.658)
Number of cooperative banks per 1000 -7.556* -5.035 -3.901
inhabitants in the region in 1936 (3.967) (4.917) (4.813)
Bank oﬃces per 1000 inhabitants 0.537*** 0.427** 0.368**
in the region in 1936 (0.141) (0.164) (0.161)
Log of provincial value added pro 0.085 0.063
capita in 1951 (0.122) (0.125)
South dummy -0.036
(0.032)
Observations 95 95 95
R-squared 0.268 0.272 0.274
31Table 4: Eﬀects of the 1936 banking regulation on the level on interest
rates on ﬁrm loans before deregulation.
The table shows the eﬀects of the 1936 banking structure on interest rates on loans charged to ﬁrms on credit lines before
deregulation. The data include a cross-section of bank-ﬁrm loan contracts for the year 1991. The dependent variable is the interest
rate charged to ﬁrm i by bank k at time t minus the prime rate at time t. Size of the ﬁrm is the logarithm of sales. We measure
the size of the bank by logarithm of total bank assets. The percentage of non-performing loans is a bank speciﬁc variable and it
calculated as the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, reported in brackets, are
adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at less than 1%; (**): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 1%; (*): coeﬃcient
signiﬁcant at the 5%.
32Interest rates on loans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of branches from local, non-national banks: 1936 -0.6668* -0.6403 -0.1010 -0.1449
(0.3737) (0.4394) (0.4117) (0.4387)
Number of savings banks per capita in the region: 1936 -0.8266** -0.8192** -0.6308** -0.6466*
(0.3037) (0.3218) (0.2856) (0.3154)
Number of cooperative banks per capita in the region: 1936 0.2622*** 0.2785** 0.1492** 0.1248
(0.0803) (0.0983) (0.0616) (0.0884)
Number of branches per inhabitant in the region: 1936 -0.0014 0.0023
(0.0053) (0.0057)
Return on sales of the ﬁrm 0.0040 0.0040 0.0052* 0.0052*
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0028)
Leverage of the ﬁrm 0.0036** 0.0037** 0.0044*** 0.0044***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Size of the ﬁrm -0.6602*** -0.6599*** -0.6092*** -0.6095***
(0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0180) (0.0181)
Score measuring probability of default of the ﬁrm 0.1842*** 0.1839*** 0.1835*** 0.1838***
(0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0178) (0.0176)
Size of the bank 0.0285 0.0285
(0.0357) (0.0356)
Percentage of non-performing loans of the bank -0.0129*** -0.0129***
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Return on assets of the bank -0.5717*** -0.5653***
(0.1882) (0.1795)
Bank ﬁxed eﬀect no no yes yes
Observations 35527 35527 35590 35590
R-squared 0.174 0.174 0.243 0.243
33Table 5. Estimating the degree of competition in local markets
Panel A of the table shows the coeﬃcients on the provincial dummies from a regression of ﬁrm level interest rate spread on ﬁrm
characteristics, bank characteristics and a full set of provincial dummies. The interest rate spread is computed as the diﬀerence
between the interest rate charged by each bank lending to the ﬁrm and the average interest rate on deposits in the province
where the bank is located; ﬁrm characteristics include the return on sales, leverage, size (log assets), ﬁrm propensity score; bank
level controls include log assets, returns on assets, the ratio of non-performing loans on total loans outstanding and dummies for
state or local government bank ownership (the ﬁrst dummy is equal to 1 if the bank is a Savings bank, the second if the bank is
state-owned). The coeﬃcients on the provincial dummies are our measures of the ﬁnancial intermediaries monopoly power in the
local market. To transform them in a measure of degree of competition we compute Competition = max(coeﬃcient on provincial
dummies) - coeﬃcient on provincial dummies so that the lowest competitive local markets is standardized to zero. Panel B shows
a regression of the competition indicator on the 1936 bank characteristics (ﬁrst column) and on the indicator of easiness in the
access to the local credit market computed by Guiso et. al (2004)
34Panel A:
Province Competition Province Competition Province Competition Province Competition Province Competition
name index name index name index name index name index
Catanzaro 0 Potenza 1.388207 Sassari 1.816366 Imperia 2.196466 Massa 2.62023
Benevento 0.031895 Ascoli 1.400714 Perugia 1.828679 Ragusa 2.211654 Firenze 2.6363341
Sondrio 0.253221 Bolzano 1.456479 Milano 1.84595 Ancona 2.22633 Mantova 2.6414935
Cosenza 0.391934 Rovigo 1.485434 Treviso 1.882854 Trento 2.228845 Aosta 2.6528422
Napoli 0.528824 Como 1.492609 Lucca 1.904548 Siena 2.236245 Trieste 2.6982466
Taranto 0.535311 Nuoro 1.514542 Torino 1.905712 Vicenza 2.236333 Piacenza 2.7345644
Isernia 0.560263 Avellino 1.541625 Bari 1.90797 Agrigento 2.270138 Caltanisetta 2.7908675
Enna 0.653263 Padova 1.556788 Palermo 1.923697 Terni 2.289703 Parma 2.8373181
Caserta 0.822046 Frosinone 1.579069 Laspezia 1.94058 Bergamo 2.29452 Udine 2.8790204
Latina 0.871723 Cagliari 1.597684 Pistoia 1.957966 L’Aquila 2.294854 Reggio E. 2.8798281
Chieti 0.933558 Arezzo 1.634093 Genova 2.010391 Oristano 2.319269 Bologna 2.9404274
Salerno 0.975705 Cremona 1.65746 Siracusa 2.032775 Cuneo 2.357154 Forl 3.0157763
Brindisi 1.055466 Verona 1.688914 Alessandria 2.04661 Trapani 2.372764 Modena 3.3349854
Reggio C. 1.108448 Messina 1.700405 Pordenone 2.085999 Savona 2.431444 Pesaro 3.3868081
Vercelli 1.122587 Teramo 1.704814 Belluno 2.117552 Foggia 2.45185 Rieti 3.4483715
Matera 1.152155 Catania 1.753228 Gorizia 2.121684 Macerata 2.488825 Ravenna 3.627566
Lecce 1.21183 Brescia 1.754628 Pavia 2.125591 Ferrara 2.490959
Pescara 1.284543 Novara 1.755903 Asti 2.12889 Livorno 2.514496
Grosseto 1.351493 Varese 1.786024 Viterbo 2.166587 Pisa 2.553943
Potenza 1.388207 Roma 1.814504 Venezia 2.180604 Campobasso 2.581165
3
5Panel B:
Index of bank competition
I II III
Local ﬁnancial development 2.779***
(0.561)
Fraction of bank oﬃces owned 1.167*** 1.296***
by local banks in 1936 (0.473) 0.453
Number of savings banks per 1000 79.946*** 92.710***
inhabitants in the region in 1936 (27.818) (25.507)
Number of cooperative banks per 1000 -19.946
inhabitants in the region in 1936 (14.420)
Bank oﬃces per 1000 inhabitants 1.429
in the region in 1936 (0.860)
Observations 93 93 93
R-squared 0.269 0.2234 0.2121
36Table 6. Eﬀects of competition on the value of loans extended
The table shows the eﬀect of competition in the local credit market on the extension of loans prior to liberalization. The left
hand side is the value of loans extended scalded by value added in 1985. South is a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm is located in
a region south of Rome. Competition is our measure of bank competition, based on interest rate spreads, derived in Table 5. IV
estimate use as instruments the 1936 measures of the structure of the banking system. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are
adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at less than 1%; (**): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 1%; (*): coeﬃcient
signiﬁcant at the 5%. A constant is also included in the regressions (coeﬃcient not reported).
Ratio of loans to value added
I II III IV
Competition in the local 0.037** 0.008 -0.009 -0.161
banking market (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.098)
South dummy -0.101** 0.073 0.087
(0.043) (0.080) (0.089)
Log of provincial value added pro capita in 1981 0.382*** 0.633***
(0.131) (0.206)
Observations 95 95 95 95
R-squared 0.019 0.064 0.102
37Table 7. Eﬀect of competition on access to credit
In panel A the left hand side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a household is credit constrained (i.e., declares it has been
turned down for a loan or discouraged from applying) and zero otherwise. The estimates include data from two SHIW surveys
prior to liberalization (1989-1991). Competition is our measure of bank competition, based on interest rate spreads, derived in
Table 5. In panel B the left hand side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a ﬁrm is credit constrained (i.e., declares it has been turned
down for a loan or discouraged from applying) and zero otherwise. The estimates include observations from the surveys covering
the years 1988-1995. IV estimate use as instruments the 1936 measures of the structure of the banking system. Standard errors,
reported in brackets, are adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at less than 1%; (**): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant
at the 1%; (*): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 5%.
38Panel A:
Probability a household is rationed
I II III
Degree of bank competition -0.0074*** -0.0177*** -0.0170**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.0081)
Percentage of ﬁrms bankrupts 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004*
in the province (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Percentage of bad loans in the province 0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Financial liabilities 0.0073*** 0.0074*** 0.0074***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Number of people living in the household 0.0075*** 0.0067*** 0.0067***
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Age of the head of the household -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Net disposable income (000 lire) -0.0000 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Net disposable income (squared) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Net real wealth (000 lire) -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Net real wealth (squared) 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Size of the town 0.0043** 0.0041** 0.0041**
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Years of schooling -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Head is a male -0.0065* -0.0063* -0.0063*
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Head is married 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Head is a male -0.0065* -0.0063* -0.0063*
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)




Observations 16451 16451 16451
R-squared 0.022 0.02 0.02
39Panel B:
Probability a ﬁrm is rationed
I II III
Degree of bank competition -0.0059 -0.0258** -0.0270**
(0.0053) (0.0122) (0.0128)
Share of exported output -0.0011 0.0019 0.0024
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0146)
Firm is state-owned 0.0548*** 0.0509*** 0.0504***
(0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0152)
Log(employment) -0.0139*** -0.0142*** -0.0139***
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022)
The ﬁrm is hiring workers 0.0339*** 0.0357*** 0.0357***
(0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0104)
The ﬁrm is ﬁring workers 0.0507*** 0.0521*** 0.0520***
(0.0096) (0.0098) (0.0098)




Year dummies YES YES YES
Observations 8,126 8,126 8,126
R-squared 0.027 0.024 0.024
40Table 8. Eﬀects of competition on bad loans
In the ﬁrst ﬁve columns the dependent variable is the average ﬂow of the number non-performing bank loans as a fraction of the number of
existing loans in a province in the period 1984-1966. In the remaining ﬁve columns it is ﬂow of the value of non performing loans on outstanding
stock of loans in a province over the same period. South is a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm is located in a region south of Rome. Competition is our
measure of bank competition, based on interest rate spreads, derived in Table 5. IV estimate use as instruments the 1936 measures of the structure
of the banking system. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at less than 1%; (**):
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 1%; (*): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 5%. A constant is also included in the regressions (coeﬃcient not reported).
Bad loans (number) Bad loans (quantity)
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Competition in the local -0.074 0.138 0.217* 0.802* -0.356 0.068 0.179 1.908**
banking market (0.113) (0.130) (0.125) (0.427) (0.336) (0.333) (0.315) (0.948)
South dummy 0.726*** -0.092 -0.147 1.450*** 0.304 0.142
(0.213) (0.404) (0.432) (0.394) (0.970) (1.055)
Log of provincial value added pro capite in 1981 -1.800** -2.766*** -2.523 -5.378**
(0.726) (0.987) (1.744) (2.541)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
R-squared 0.004 0.145 0.196 0.022 0.144 0.166
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1Table 9. Eﬀect of competition on number of ﬁrms and economic growth
In panel A the dependent variable is the number of ﬁrms present per 100 people living in the province in 1996-1998. In Panel
B it is the average real annual growth rate (in percentage points) in the per capita valued added in the province in the period
1951-1991. South is a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm is located in a region south of Rome. Infrastructural investment is the sum
of all the infrastructural investments in the period 1936-1951 divided by the 1951 GDP per capita. Competition is our measure
of bank competition, based on interest rate spreads, derived in Table 5. IV estimate use as instruments the 1936 measures of
the structure of the banking system. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coeﬃcient
signiﬁcant at less than 1%; (**): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 1%; (*): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 5%. A constant is also included
in the regressions (coeﬃcient not reported).
Panel A:
Number of ﬁrms per 100 people in province
I II III
Log of provincial value 1.493 1.065 -0.197
added (0.952) (1.007) (1.560)
South dummy -0.971* -0.717 0.031
(0.516) (0.539) (0.998)
Competition in the local 0.588*** 2.318***
banking market (0.162) (0.854)




I II III IV V
Log of provincial value -1.342*** -2.217*** -2.217*** -2.237*** -2.296***
added in 1951 (0.186) (0.149) (0.149) (0.154) (0.189)
Investments -0.048 -0.071 -0.071 -0.081 -0.113
(0.081) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.071)
South dummy -0.954*** -0.954*** -0.895*** -0.718***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.086) (0.167)
Competition in the local 0.086 0.344**
banking market (0.056) (0.162)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95
R-squared 0.419 0.734 0.734 0.742 0.672
43Table 10. Eﬀect of credit market liberalization on access to credit
In panel A the left hand side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a household is credit constrained (i.e., declares it has been
turned down for a loan or discouraged from applying) and zero otherwise. The estimates include data from two SHIW surveys
both prior to liberalization (1989-1991) and after liberalization (1998-2000). In panel B the left hand side variable is a dummy
equal to 1 if a ﬁrm is credit constrained (i.e., declares it has been turned down for a loan or discouraged from applying) and
zero otherwise. The estimates include observation both for the period prior to liberalization (1988-1995) and after liberalization
(1997-2001). IV estimate use as instruments the 1936 measures of the structure of the banking system. Competition is our measure
of bank competition, based on interest rate spreads, derived in Table 5. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are adjusted for
regional clustering. (***): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at less than 1%; (**): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 1%; (*): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant
at the 5%.
44Panel A:
Probability a household is rationed
I II III
Degree of bank competition -0.0087*** -0.0211*** -0.0241***
(0.0023) (0.0063) (0.008)
Competition*liberalization dummy 0.0078* 0.0235*** 0.0238***
(0.0045) (0.0074) (0.0076)
Percentage of ﬁrms bankrupt 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Percentage of bad loan in the province -0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0005
(0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0021)
Financial liabilities 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Number of people living in the household 0.0055*** 0.0050*** 0.0051***
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Age of the head of the household -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0008***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Net disposable income (million lire) -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Net disposable income (square) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Net real wealth (million lire) -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Net real wealth (square) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Size of the town 0.0034*** 0.0034** 0.0034**
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Years of schooling -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Head is a male -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Head is married -0.0036 -0.0035 -0.0036
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Size of the town 0.0034*** 0.0034** 0.0034**
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Years of schooling -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Head is a male -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Head is married -0.0036 -0.0035 -0.0036
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)




Observations 29102 29102 29102
R-squared 0.014 0.012 0.011
45Panel B:
Probability a ﬁrm is rationed
I II III
Degree of bank competition -0.0075 -0.0280** -0.0301**
(0.005) (0.012) (0.013)
Degree of bank competition X 0.003 0.005 0.004
liberalization dummy (0.006) (0.012) (0.012)
Share of exported output -0.0072 -0.0035 -0.0026
(0.0094) (0.009) (0.0094)
Firm is state-owned 0.0447*** 0.0416*** 0.0403***
(0.0123) (0.012) (0.0124)
Log(employment) -0.0119*** -0.0118*** -0.0113***
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.0017)
The ﬁrm is hiring workers 0.0122 0.0141* 0.0138*
(0.0078) (0.008) (0.0080)
The ﬁrm is ﬁring workers 0.0244*** 0.0260*** 0.0257***
(0.0080) (0.008) (0.0081)




Year dummies YES YES YES
Observations 15,565 15,565 15,565
R-squared 0.023 0.019 0.019
46Table 11. Eﬀects of credit market liberalization on bad loans
In Panel A the dependent variable is the change in the average ﬂow of the number non-performing bank loans as a fraction of the number of
existing loans in a province from 1985 to 1998. In Panel B it is the change in the ﬂow of the value of non performing loans on outstanding stock
of loans in a province over the same period. South is a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm is located in a region south of Rome. Competition is our
measure of bank competition, based on interest rate spreads, derived in Table 5. IV estimate use as instruments the 1936 measures of the structure
of the banking system. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at less than 1%; (**):
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 1%; (*): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 5%. A constant is also included in the regressions (coeﬃcient not reported).
Change in bad loans (number) Change in bad loans (quantity)
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Competition in the local -0.726*** -0.454** -0.419** -1.690** -0.827 -1.067* -0.892 -3.712**
banking market (0.149) (0.200) (0.211) (0.675) (0.516) (0.622) (0.599) (1.588)
South dummy 0.929*** 0.574 0.694 -0.818 -2.621 -2.356
(0.338) (0.579) (0.676) (0.835) (2.224) (2.346)
Log of provincial value added pro capita in 1981 -0.782 1.316 -3.970 0.684
(1.106) (1.605) (3.858) (4.976)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
R-squared 0.185 0.284 0.288 0.039 0.052 0.069
4
7Table 12. Eﬀects of credit market liberalization on ﬁrm creation and growth
In panel A the dependent variable is the number of new ﬁrms created per 100 people living in the province (average of 1996-98,
source ISTAT). In Panel B it is the diﬀerence between the average growth in the per capita valued added in the province in the
period 1991-1999 and the average growth rate in the same area in the period 1951-1999. The diﬀerence in the log GDP is the
diﬀerence between the log of the per capita GDP at the beginning of deregulation (1991) and the log of the per capita GDP
at the beginning of the regulation period (1951). Diﬀerence in infrastructural investment is the diﬀerence between the sum of
all the infrastructural investments before deregulation (1951-1991) divided by the 1991 GDP per capita and the sum of all the
infrastructural investments before the regulation period (1936-1951) divided by the 1951 GDP per capita. Competition is our
measure of bank competition, based on interest rate spreads, derived in Table 5. IV estimate use as instruments the 1936 measures
of the structure of the banking system. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coeﬃcient
signiﬁcant at less than 1%; (**): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 1%; (*): coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 5%. A constant is also included
in the regressions (coeﬃcient not reported).
Panel A:
New ﬁrms created per 100 people in province
I II III
Log of provincial value 1.493 1.065 -0.197
added (0.952) (1.007) (1.560)
South dummy -0.971* -0.717 0.031
(0.516) (0.539) (0.998)
Competition in the local 0.588*** 2.318***
banking market (0.162) (0.854)





Diﬀerence in the log of the provincial -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025***
value added at the beginning of the period (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Competition in the local -0.002** -0.002** -0.004***
banking market (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Change in infrastructural investments -0.001* -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 103 103 103
R-squared 0.508 0.521 0.470
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